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This paper is concerned with the reconstruction of a core argument that 
can be extracted from Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’ and that is intended 
to ‘debunk’ moral realism by appeal to evolution. The argument, which is 
best taken to have the form of an undermining defeater argument, fails, 
I argue. A simple, fi rst formulation is rejected as a non sequitur, due to 
not distinguishing between the evolutionary process that infl uences moral 
attitudes and the cognitive system generating moral attitudes. Reformula-
tions that respect the distinction and that could make the argument valid, 
however, bring in an implausible premise about an implication from evo-
lutionary infl uence to unreliability. Crucially, perception provides a coun-
terexample, and the fi tness contribution of reliably accurate representa-
tion has to be taken into account. Then the moral realist can explain why 
and how evolution indirectly cares for the truth of moral attitudes. The 
one and only condition that has to be satisfi ed in order for this explana-
tion to work is the suffi cient epistemic accessibility of moral facts. As long 
as the moral facts are suffi ciently reliably representable, one can see how 
evolution could favor getting it right about the moral facts. Interestingly, 
apart from this epistemic constraint no further constraint and, in particu-
lar, no objectivity constraint on what the moral facts have to be like can be 
derived. Thus, the only problem for the moral realist is to make good on 
epistemic access to moral facts—an old problem, not a new one.
Keywords: Evolution, ethics, debunking, moral realism, reactive 
attitudes.
1. Introduction
Discrediting a view or set of belief-like attitudes that aspire to truth by 
so-called ‘debunking’ has become quite popular.1 An especially interest-
1 See, for example, Kahane (2011) for a list of examples and some general 
discussion of debunking arguments.
418 F. Hofmann, Evolution and Ethics: No Streetian Debunking
ing case is the case of moral attitudes and evolution. The debunking ar-
gument attacks our moral attitudes (or an important part of them)2 by 
pointing out that the force that has shaped these moral attitudes—evo-
lution—is blind to issues of truth and only cares about fi tness and sur-
vival.3 Take ‘altruistic attitudes’ as the core of our moral attitudes. An 
evolutionary explanation of these attitudes can be given by reference 
to the fi tness-conduciveness of certain kinds of cooperative behavior 
towards one’s kin or group. If these altruistic attitudes are understood 
realistically, we run into a problem: they might be true, but only ac-
cidentally so, since the relevant evolutionary forces did not care about 
truth. Or so the debunking line of thought runs.
Not too long ago, Sharon Street has presented an evolutionary 
debunking argument against moral realism, called the ‘Darwinian 
Dilemma’.4 So she is turning the argument around, targeting the real-
istic assumption that the relevant attitudes aspire to truth and are, at 
least sometimes, true—what is often called ‘moral realism’. (Whether 
realism is or should be construed as implying some objectivity condition 
can initially be left open and will be investigated later.) The argument 
is clearly of high signifi cance, since it attempts to bring to fall an entire 
approach in (meta-)ethics, i.e., moral realism. Street’s formulation of 
the argument, however, is burdened with considerations that rather 
distract from those valuable and interesting points that may constitute 
a sound argument against moral realism. One could try to disentangle 
the various claims and streams of thought in her presentation(s) of 
the argument, which would require an immense amount of careful in-
terpretational work. Here I would like to proceed in a different way, 
namely, by providing a clear and systematic reconstruction of a core ar-
gument that can be extracted from Street’s considerations, without any 
side roads or unnecessary accompaniments. If it turned out that the 
argument is not really Street’s argument, this should not be too wor-
risome, since it is at least similar and in any case important enough.5
2 I will take the relevant moral attitudes to be beliefs or suffi ciently belief-like, 
since (only) they are aspiring to truth. Any difference should not matter to the 
argument. Street includes desires (and attitudes of approval and disproval) among 
the evaluative attitudes (cf. Street 2008: fn. 3). However, these are not really at 
stake since they are not truth evaluable and, therefore, the issue of reliability does 
not arise for them, at least on a standard conception of desires.
3 A particularly succinct statement of this claim—or dogma, indeed—can be 
found in Burge (2010), in particular, ch. 8. Burge discusses this idea in the context 
of a naturalistic teleosemantics which conceives of representational functions as 
biological functions, and tries to argue that it has to fail for exactly that reason. For a 
convincing criticism of Burge’s argument see Graham (2014). For another statement 
of the claim see, for example, Stich (1990: 62).
4 The original statement is to be found in Street (2006). Street explains the 
argument further and, in particular, defends it against the criticism by Copp (2008) 
in Street (2008). Street takes value realism in general as her target. In order to keep 
the discussion in reasonable bounds here, I will restrict myself to the moral part of 
value realism, i.e., to moral realism.
5 There are several problematic aspects to the exposition of the ‘Darwinian 
Dilemma’ as to be found in Street’s writings. I only mention a few of them here. It is 
 F. Hofmann, Evolution and Ethics: No Streetian Debunking 419
In the following I will try to carve out and (re-)formulate what I take 
to be the heart of the considerations that can be found in Street’s writ-
ings and that might provide a genuine evolutionary argument against 
moral realism.6 Exegetical issues will not be my primary concern, but 
systematic reconstruction.7 I will try to show that in the end, the ar-
gument fails. The moral realist can tell a plausible story about how 
evolution cares for the reliability of moral attitudes—for in a nutshell, 
evolution indirectly cares (or, at least, can care) for truth, and there is 
a plausible story about how this could work. The new part of the story 
that will be told here appeals to reactive attitudes (in Peter Strawson’s 
sense) as a social mechanism that explains how the relevant cognitive 
process could be reliable after all. It provides a new picture of how 
evolutionary forces could have indirectly resulted in reliability. This 
adds signifi cant support to the idea of indirect truth tracking as a re-
sponse to the debunking challenge. Interestingly, this makes appeal 
to other strategies for defending moral realism superfl uous (like ap-
peal to the additional epistemological potential of rational refl ection, 
(quasi-)conceptual truth, or a threat of self-defeat within the debunk-
ing argument).8 Fortunately, as will be argued at the end, there will not 
questionable whether putting the argument in the form of a dilemma is fortunate. 
Construing it as a reductio of the moral realist assumption, by way of a defeater 
argument, seems more appropriate, as I will try to show. – Graber has criticized 
Street for setting things up in the form of a dilemma, too (cf. Graber 2012: 594). 
Graber suggests that we should take the argument to be an abductive one, i.e., an 
argument about best explanation. I disagree. Furthermore, Street’s formulation also 
depends on a demand for reasons (for believing in the reliability of the source of our 
moral attitudes), or even on a demand for independent reasons—thus leading into 
issues of epistemic circularity that are at most implicitly hinted at by Street but 
by no means discussed explicitly and to a suffi cient extent (cf. Street 2008: sc. 6). 
Externalists will reject such a demand for reasons. A further point of unclarity is the 
defi nition of ‘moral realism’ as it is the target of the argument. Street burdens ‘moral 
realism’ (and equally realism about value) with an element of objectivity which is 
not really required for any kind of moral realism, but only for an objective moral 
realism (cf. Street 2006: 110; Street 2008: 208 and, in particular, fn. 3). If reliability 
is the primary issue, why is not any kind of moral realism affected?, one can wonder. 
(Skarsaune presents some good critical observations about Street’s characterization 
of ‘moral realism’ in Skarsaune 2011: sc. 5.)
6 Thus, to repeat, I will restrict the discussion to moral realism (and ignore non-
moral value realism). Therein I follow Copp (2008). Street notes that she sees some 
diffi culties with this restriction since it “introduces crucial complexities having to do 
with morality/reasons internalism” (Street 2008: 209). I have to confess that I fail to 
see any signifi cant problem with the restriction.
7 Some useful exegetical work, including important interpretational questions, has 
been provided by Copp (2008), Enoch (2010), Skarsaune (2011), and Garber (2012).
8 Brosnan (2011) and FitzPatrick (2015) try to argue that rational refl ection can 
lead to reliable belief formation (even if starting with initially false input beliefs). 
Conceptual truths, or something close enough, have been offered in response to 
debunking arguments by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014). The charge of self-defeat 
is discussed in Kyriacou (2016).
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be any new signifi cant epistemological costs to the proposed response 
in defense of moral realism.9
2. Reconstructing a Streetian 
evolutionary argument (crude version)
Here is my proposal about how to formulate the initial, crude argu-
ment, argument A1:
A1:
(1) Our moral attitudes (MAs) are signifi cantly infl uenced by an 
evolutionary process E.
(2) E is not truth-tracking.
____
(3) Our moral attitudes (MAs) are not (epistemically) justifi ed.10
Some comments on the premises are in order. Premise (1) is a rough 
statement that leaves out which moral attitudes exactly are at stake. 
I have already indicated that we are talking about the ‘altruistic core’ 
of our moral attitudes, concerning positive evaluation of cooperation 
and family support etc. (even at some cost to one’s own self-interest). 
For brevity’s sake I will call them the ‘MAs’. (As already mentioned, I 
will treat the MAs as beliefs or suffi ciently belief-like to be epistemi-
cally evaluable in the relevant way. Moral attitudes that are not truth-
evaluable cannot be the target of the argument.) Of course, there is 
no precise defi nition of what counts as ‘signifi cant infl uence’. But it 
seems to be agreed on by all parties in the discussion that the infl uence 
is signifi cant, at least for the sake of the argument. After all, it could 
turn out to be the case (if it has not yet). So let us take premise (1) for 
granted for the moment and see where it leads. (We will see soon that 
some reformulation is necessary.)
9 Similar arguments against various forms of realism (evaluative realism, 
religious realism, etc.) can be found in the literature. See, for example, Joyce 
(2008) and Ruse, Wilson (1995). Interesting comparisons of Street’s arguments and 
Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against atheism can be found in Crow (2015) 
and Moon (2016). A very good overview on evolutionary debunking arguments is 
Vavova (2015). Vavova also presents her own reconstruction of the most promising 
evolutionary argument which is different from the one I am reconstruing here. She 
does not recognize the distinction between evolutionary and cognitive processes that 
I will argue for in the next section, and she does not discuss the criticism of, and 
reply to, the argument that I will present in section 4. The same is true of Vavova’s 
earlier discussion in Vavova (2014).
10 This is essentially an instance of the argument schema that Kahane 
proposes as a general schema for debunking arguments, see Kahane (2011: 111). 
Kahane discusses Street’s argument as fi tting into this schema (cf. Kahane 2011: 
sc. 3). However, Kahane does not present the criticism that I am going to lay out 
here. Rather, he gets into issues of objectivity and whether the argument over-
generalizes—which are not the problems I am discussing here. Skarsaune (2011) 
also gets into the issue of what ‘independence of our attitudes’ means and whether 
philosophers like Nagel or Parfi t hold that moral truths are ‘independent’ in this or 
that sense.
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Premise (2) is the statement of evolution’s blindness to truth. Evolu-
tion does not care for truth but only about survival or practical value. 
This slogan is taken to amount to a lack of truth-tracking. The evolu-
tionary process E is epistemically evaluated as a bad one: it does not 
push toward truth, it is not truth-conducive.
Why is (3) supposed to follow?—I propose that we should take the 
argument to have the form of a defeater argument or, more precisely, 
an undermining-defeater argument. 11 Its premises provide an under-
mining defeater against the epistemic justifi cation of the relevant mor-
al attitudes.12
Famously, Pollock distinguished between two kinds of defeaters, 
rebutting and undermining (or undercutting) defeaters.13 The rebut-
ting defeaters (against the belief that p) are simply reasons for the op-
posite belief, i.e., belief that non-p. The undermining defeaters consist 
in reasons against the reliability of the source of one’s belief that p. 
They undermine the source as not being reliable and, thus, as not is-
suing (ultima facie) justifi ed belief (as long as they are not themselves 
undermined, of course).14 I propose to take the evolutionary debunking 
argument as a defeater argument of the undermining sort. The source 
is taken to be the evolutionary process E and its lack of truth-tracking 
is taken to undermine E’s reliability.
If taken in this way, we can see how one could think that the conclu-
sion (3) follows from the premises. Premise (1) establishes a source of 
our MAs, and premise (2) discredits it, so the MAs lose the epistemic 
status of being justifi ed. It is just like when a belief loses epistemic jus-
tifi cation if one acknowledges that it has been generated by unreliable 
wishful thinking, for example.15
Prima facie, A1 looks like a sound defeater argument. The history of 
our moral attitudes seems to be discredited such that their (epistemic) 
justifi cation is undermined. For what comes from a source that does 
not track truth could at best be accidentally true—and that is not good 
enough for (epistemic) justifi cation.16
11 In general, it seems that ‘debunking arguments’ can be best understood as 
undermining-defeater arguments. (Perhaps there are some exceptions, but this 
should be the rule.) Kahane makes the same proposal (cf. Kahane 2011: 105–6). 
Schafer also takes the heart of Street’s considerations to be aiming at an (a posteriori) 
defeater (of an a priori entitlement). And he criticizes the attempt for not relying on 
the idea that the empirical facts of evolutionary theory could provide a defeater for a 
normative claim (cf. Schafer 2010).
12 It is quite clear that our primary concern here is with doxastic justifi cation, not 
with propositional justifi cation or personal justifi cation.
13 Cf. Pollock (1986) and, for a general overview on evidence, Kelly (2014).
14 To be more explicit, a belief might be prima facie justifi ed, but any undermining 
defeater cancels its ultima facie justifi cation (as long as it is not undermined itself). 
Cf., for example, Senor (1996).
15 Of course, the undermining defeater is supposed to be not defeated itself.
16 In general epistemology there is quite a controversy about how to understand 
how (undermining) defeaters exactly work, and some epistemological views seem 
to have problems here. (For some recent discussions of defeaters see, for example, 
422 F. Hofmann, Evolution and Ethics: No Streetian Debunking
However, the appearance is misleading. There are at least two 
big problems with that argument. First, and most importantly, as it 
stands, argument A1 is a non sequitur. And second, and related to that, 
it is unclear how premise (2) is really to be understood (in the best, 
charitable way). Let me explain.
Firstly, the argument is a non sequitur. This is so since E is not a cog-
nitive process. Therefore, the non-truth-tracking of E, stated in premise 
(2), is simply not directly relevant to the epistemic status of justifi cation 
of our MAs. (It might be indirectly relevant—we will come back to that 
in due course.) What matters is whether the relevant cognitive process, 
i.e., the cognitive process of which our MAs are the outcomes, is reliable 
or not. But since E is not a cognitive process, E’s blindness to truth is not 
directly relevant. (Its indirect relevance would have to be made explicit, 
and I will try to do so soon.) As the argument A1 stands, it is a non 
sequitur. Premises (1) and (2) do not provide an undermining defeater 
against the assumption that the relevant cognitive process of which our 
MAs are the outcome is reliable. An undermining defeater argument has 
to provide reason against the reliability of the relevant cognitive process, 
since only the relevant cognitive process’s reliability is what matters for 
the epistemic  justifi cation of its outcomes. No such reason has been pro-
vided so far.17 This is the decisive shortcoming of argument A1.18
Bergmann (2006) and Hofmann (2013).) But the phenomenon is widely acknowledged, 
and my discussion does not depend on any controversial account of, or assumptions 
about, undermining defeaters. In particular, it does not depend on whether one goes 
for a psychologistic or an anti-psychologistic conception of defeaters (i.e., whether 
one conceives of defeaters as beliefs or the propositions believed).
17 That cognitive processes are the relevant items when it comes to epistemic 
justifi cation and defeaters is a common assumption in general epistemology, at 
least for those epistemologists which admit the relevance of (certain aspects of) the 
history of a belief (cf., for example, Goldman 1979). If one opts for an a-historical, 
‘current time-slice’ epistemology, such as, for example, Pryor’s dogmatism, then no 
historical processes are directly relevant to the status of epistemic justifi cation. Then, 
however, the prospects for an evolutionary undermining defeater argument are even 
dimmer. So the assumption that the history of an attitude matters is granted for 
the sake of the argument, and not a substantial assumption that I am making. But 
if the history is relevant, we have to be clear about which parts or aspects of the 
history of a belief are relevant. There is of course some signifi cant controversy about 
the individuation of cognitive processes, whether they are more narrowly or more 
broadly construed and whether they are to be construed individually or socially. 
The generality problem is a major topic here. (Cf., for example, Goldman 2008. For 
a social individuation see Goldberg 2010.) But some limits are highly plausible and 
commonly accepted. In particular, it is quite clear that a cognitive process does not 
extend temporally back beyond the individual’s existence. The infl uence of evolution 
lies of course way back in the past, much beyond the individual’s life. Thus the 
evolutionary process E cannot count as a cognitive process.
18 The very idea of this criticism can be found in Wielenberg (2014). Wielenberg, 
however, does not try to re-formulate the argument and, thus, does not arrive at the—
very signifi cant—result that will be forthcoming from the following reformulations, 
namely, that the indirect ‘truth tracking’ account can be upheld and spelled out by 
means of a social reactive attitudes story (see section 4, below).
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Secondly, premise (2) is unclear. What does it mean to say that ‘E 
is not truth-tracking’? Once we have distinguished between the cogni-
tive process that is responsible for our MAs and the evolutionary pro-
cess that has signifi cantly infl uenced our cognitive systems, we have 
to spell out the ‘non-truth-tracking’ of the evolutionary process. It is 
not a cognitive process, and so talk of reliability is not appropriate or 
must be understood in some other way (different from how it is un-
derstood when applied to cognitive systems). How then is the lack of 
‘truth-tracking’ of E to be understood?19
Can we save the argument by reformulation?, you may ask. If we 
want to formulate a sequitur argument, we have to reformulate every-
thing in terms of the cognitive process—call it ‘C’—which produces the 
MAs in us. In effect, the recipe for reformulation is quite clear. First, 
we have to split premise (1) into two, so to speak, one pertaining to 
the cognitive process C and another one pertaining to the evolutionary 
process E. Second, we have to fi nd a suitable explication or replacement 
for premise (2).
3. Refi ning the argument
Following the recipe leads quite naturally to the following reformula-
tion of the argument—call it argument A2:
A2:
(1a) Our MAs are produced by a cognitive process C.
(1b) C has been signifi cantly infl uenced by E.
(2) E infl uences cognitive processes signifi cantly because of their fi t-
ness contribution.20
_____
(3) Our MAs are not justifi ed.
The problem with this reformulation, however, is quite clear: it is still 
a non sequitur. The premises are silent about the reliability of the rel-
evant cognitive process C. By merely stating that the evolutionary pro-
cess E goes by fi tness contribution, we have not yet been told whether 
the result of E’s infl uence is reliable or not. In other words, we have not 
yet spelled out the fi rst part of the slogan, ‘evolution does not care for 
truth …’, but only the second part, ‘… but (only) about survival’. Even 
if we leave in the ‘only’ it is not clear what follows for the issue of C’s 
reliability. We could change premise (2) accordingly:
19 A note on the exegetical debate may be in order here. Copp (2008), Enoch (2010), 
and Skarsaune (2011) struggle with understanding Street’s ‘tracking account’. But 
it seems that the issue is undecidable since unclear. Only cognitive processes, or 
systems, that produce truth-evaluable states are in the business of ‘tracking truth’, 
i.e., are supposed to be reliable. The evolutionary process is no such process and, 
thus, falls outside of any reliable/unreliable classifi cation.
20 I choose the ‘because of’ formulation in order to avoid any controversial 
commitment to teleological notions, such as selection-for. One could equally well 
speak of ‘according to’. Nothing hangs on this.
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(2’) E infl uences cognitive processes signifi cantly because of, and 
only because of, their fi tness contribution.
Still it would be unclear what consequences for reliability this would 
have. Any such consequences should be spelled out explicitly, since 
they are not obvious at all and are the ones that do the crucial work in 
the argument. All we are entitled to assume from contemporary evo-
lutionary theory is (1b) and (2) or (2’), but evolutionary theory neither 
contains nor implies any claim about the unreliability of C.
So how are we to fi ll in the required additional premise in the best 
possible way?21 I submit that the best supplemented argument, argu-
ment A3, reads like this:
A3:
(1a) Our MAs are produced by a cognitive process C.
(1b) C has been signifi cantly infl uenced by E.
(2a) E infl uences cognitive processes signifi cantly because of their fi t-
ness contribution.22
(2b) If C has been signifi cantly infl uenced by E because of a fi tness 
contribution, then C is not reliable.
_____
(3) Our MAs are not justifi ed.
Now the problem lies with premise (2b). This further premise (2b) is ex-
plicitly about reliability or truth-tracking, and so the gap is fi lled. But 
(2b) is not plausible (as will be shown in a minute).  We have turned 
the argument into a sequitur, but only at the price of introducing an im-
plausible assumption. Therefore, the undermining-defeater argument 
fails. And so the overall conclusion is that no reason against moral real-
ism has been presented so far. Moreover, this result remains even if we 
switch from (2a) and (2b) to (2a’) and (2b’):
(2a’) E infl uences cognitive processes signifi cantly because of, and 
only because of, their fi tness contribution.
(2b’) If C has been signifi cantly infl uenced by E because of, and only 
because of, its fi tness contribution, then C is not reliable.
It remains to be shown that premise (2b) is not plausible. There are at 
least two reasons. The fi rst reason is that there is a clear counterexam-
ple, namely, perception. Perceptual systems count as cognitive systems 
in the relevant sense, since they provide perceptual representations 
which can be correct or incorrect (accurate or inaccurate) and, thus, are 
evaluable as reliable and unreliable.23 Quite plausibly, perceptual sys-
tems (like the visual system) have been under the signifi cant infl uence 
21 There might be some unclarity about what it means to say that E exerts 
infl uence ‘because of fi tness contribution’, or that E ‘goes by fi tness’. But whatever 
unclarity there is, it is a further problem, not the problem I am belaboring here.
22 (2a) = (2). I have chosen the renaming simply because of the nicer partitioning 
that results.
23 I will switch back and forth between processes and systems. Nothing should 
hang on that.
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of evolution, and they have been so because of their fi tness contribution. 
But it is not plausible to think that perceptual systems are therefore 
unreliable. (2b) does not state a true connection between evolution’s in-
fl uence and the reliability of its outcome, the evolved cognitive process-
es.24 The second reason for rejecting (2b) is a theoretical consideration 
(that somehow generalizes the fi rst point). In general, a fi tness contri-
bution may consist exactly in reliably correct representation generated 
by a cognitive system (of the relevant part of reality, under favorable 
conditions, and in cooperation with a suitable action-control system, 
of course).25 Such reliability might be useful, or even very useful. This 
applies to our MAs just as well as to any other cognitive systems and 
processes—as long as we are dealing with truth-evaluable attitudes or 
states.26 For example, to have moral attitudes that favor cooperation 
with cooperative partners is of course very useful for getting along well 
with other individuals, on the whole and at large. (We will take up and 
describe this kind of social advantage further in the next section.) Be-
ing reliably correct about the moral facts can thus be very benefi cial. If 
there is any truth to this theoretical consideration, then premise (2b) 
cannot be true. So argument A3 is not sound.27
24  The case of perception as a counterexample has been noticed by others, for 
example, by Brosnan (2011).
25  In this connection Peter Graham has put forward very interesting 
points about the more precise way in which the truth (veridicality, accuracy) of 
representations can be understood as contributing to the fi tness of their possessors, 
even without those representations having (directly) the (teleo-)function of 
increasing fi tness. See Graham (2014). One of the most important points is that 
such contributions take the form of a whole package with a functional analysis such 
that each element does what the other elements need, if everything goes the normal 
way, in order to produce the fi tness increasing behavior. Producing true (veridical, 
accurate) representations is what the cognitive process C does (in normal conditions), 
and other elements have the job of producing behavior which is appropriate to the 
corresponding truths, based on these true representations. This seems to me to be 
exactly the way in which it could be said that ‘evolution indirectly cares for truth’. 
In this way, any suggestion of an incompatibility of adaptation on the one hand 
and reliably correct representation on the other hand can be rejected. Our cognitive 
process C can be seen to be both an adaptation (with the function of reliably producing 
true representations of moral facts) and reliable or ‘truth tracking’ (in favorable or 
normal conditions for which it is made). This is exactly how C can contribute to 
fi tness.
26 Teleosemantics even builds an account of representation on this idea of 
usefulness. There are many versions of teleosemantics that differ in details. But 
a common core is that the usefulness of (the use of a signifi cant amount of earlier) 
correct information is partly constitutive of representation (now). Cf., for example, 
Millikan (1984) and Dretske (1995).
27 Huemer has tried to present a kind of argument, albeit in a sketchy form 
(as Huemer himself admits), for the reliability of our moral attitudes or “for why 
people should have correct ethical beliefs”, as he puts it (Huemer 2005: 2). He argues 
that evolution favors having correct ethical beliefs given that these have a certain, 
‘altruistic’ content (Huemer 2005: 218–9). As I understand his sketchy argument, it 
in effect amounts to arguing against (2b).
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4. Constraints on moral facts
Now the situation is the following one. In order to block the argument, 
the moral realist appeals to the idea that evolution can indirectly care 
for truth (and, plausibly, does indirectly care for truth), namely, in the 
sense of truth providing a contribution to fi tness.28 We can now ask 
the question: what do the moral facts have to look like in order for 
this idea to work? What is required for such a contribution? Does the 
idea put any interesting constraint on the moral facts? For example, 
do they have to be ‘objective’ in any sense? Do they have to be causally 
effi cacious? One could think that there are some interesting necessary 
and/or suffi cient condition that could be derived from the moral real-
ist’s idea of reliable representation of moral facts playing the role of a 
contribution to fi tness. Which ones could that be?—Call this ‘the con-
straint question’.
The fi rst, immediate answer to the constraint  question that I will 
argue for is that the moral facts have to be capable of playing a certain 
role—call it role ‘R’. Role R can be described as follows:
(R) The moral facts must be suffi ciently reliably representable by 
the members of the group S and it must be possible that suf-
fi ciently many members of S (actively and passively) respect the 
moral facts.
The fi rst part of (R) is the more important one, for our purposes. It is 
suffi ciently reliable representability of the moral facts. In other words, 
the moral facts must not be too hard to detect. The members of the 
group have to have a quite easily available means of reliably represent-
ing the moral facts. Of course, they need not be infallible and may make 
mistakes about the moral facts sometimes. But a suffi cient amount of 
accurate representation must be guaranteed. This the epistemic condi-
tion that the fi rst part of (R) expresses.
The second, ‘practical’ part is rather obvious, but it is mentioned 
since it is required to understand the full story. It concerns the possi-
bility of doing what the moral facts require and of showing the reactive 
attitudes of praise and blame, and all the rest of the reactive attitudes 
that have been discussed since Strawson, towards someone who is, or is 
not, acting in accordance with the moral requirements.29 If it is a moral 
fact, for example, that Kim ought to help Jones (because Jones has 
been injured in some accident), then typically, Kim must be capable 
of doing what she is required. Call this the ‘active respecting of moral 
facts’. Equally, the members of the group must be capable of showing 
the positive and negative reactive attitudes towards the agents who 
act either in accordance or in violation of the moral facts, at least suffi -
ciently often. Call this the ‘passive respecting of the moral facts’. Active 
28 For the present purposes, we can count “the four Fs“ as what evolution directly 
cares for, as Graham puts it nicely: “feeding, fl eeing, fi ghting, and reproducing“ 
(Graham 2014: 19).
29 Cf. Strawson (1962).
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and passive respecting of moral facts have to be suffi ciently possible, 
says the second, ‘practical’ part of (R).
Now the new story about how evolution could indirectly favor the 
reliability of C can be told. It is a social reactive attitudes story that 
fi lls the gap in the defense of moral realism against the evolutionary 
debunking attempt. As long as suffi cient reliable representation in a 
group S is secured, and the members of S are suffi ciently capable of 
actively and passively respecting the moral facts, it will in general be of 
advantage to any individual of S to correctly represent the moral facts 
and to act in accordance with them. In our example, crudely put, if Kim 
helps Jones, she will probably be recognized as a kind, supportive per-
son and will receive praise and other positive reactions from the others. 
The moral attitudes (MAs) tend to favor such helping behavior, and so 
they indirectly contribute to the positive reactions received from other. 
(That the members of S are capable of reliably representing the actions 
performed by members of the group must also be secured, of course. 
They must be able to see whether the action fi ts the moral facts or not, 
at least suffi ciently often. I take this to be granted since uncontrover-
sial.) It is thus entirely unmysterious how a reliably working cognitive 
process C governing MAs can contribute to fi tness and survival via so-
cial interactions and the reactive attitudes therein. Linking positive 
reactions to conformity with the moral facts can do the job. MAs can 
benefi t their subjects even if they do not benefi t because they are true—
they can benefi t indirectly.30
The advantages provided by the social mechanism of reactive atti-
tudes in a group can be quite high, indeed, they can be extremely high. 
It all depends on how strong the reactive attitudes are. (As we all know, 
in fact they are quite high nowadays and include all kinds of social ex-
clusion or punishments etc.)31
At this point, we can connect the discussion directly to Street’s writ-
ings. The just-mentioned social reactive attitudes account directly re-
buts Street’s ‘implausible coincidence objection’. According to the moral 
realist, it is no mere coincidence, unexplicable or mysterious, that our 
30 Note that the proposal is not committed to any substantive normative claim 
that other third-factor accounts are committed to. For example, Enoch proposes 
the normative claim that survival and reproductive success are somewhat good 
(cf. Enoch 2010: 430). Wielenberg assumes the substantive claim that human 
beings have rights (cf. Wielenberg 2010). Normative claims like these are used 
by their proponents to argue for the reliability of our MAs. It is not entirely clear, 
however, how this argument is supposed to run. And, more importantly, it is very 
controversial whether one can rely on some such morality claim or not, since a quite 
serious suspicion of circularity or question-begging arises here. (Cf. Vavova 2014, 
Moon 2016, and Klenk 2017 for discussions on this point).
31 To connect the discussion directly to Street’s writings at this point: The 
consideration just given directly rebuts Street’s ‘implausible coincidence objection’. 
According to the moral realist, it is no mere coincidence, unexplicable or mysterious, 
that our MAs reliably represent the moral facts, and it is no mere coincidence that 
their reliably representing these moral facts is benefi cial. Cf. Street (2006: 125).
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MAs reliably represent the moral facts, and it is no mere coincidence 
that their reliably representing these moral facts is benefi cial.32
The fi rst or immediate answer to the question just given is not the 
end of it. We can go on and ask what further conditions have to be in 
place in order for truth making the envisioned contribution to fi tness. 
For we can ask what the moral facts have to be like in order to be 
suffi ciently reliably representable by the members of the group. For 
example, do they have to be ‘objective’?
The second answer to the constraint question then is that there is 
no further interesting constraint on moral facts that could be derived 
from suffi ciently reliable representability. As long as the moral facts 
are suffi ciently reliable representable, the social mechanism just de-
scribed can work. Suffi cient reliable representability may have its 
preconditions. And whatever is required for suffi cient reliable repre-
sentability has to be the case in order for the story of indirect contri-
bution to fi tness to work. If we leave to one side the second, practical 
part of role (R)—which is appropriate in the present context since it 
is not questioned by any party in the debate—what remains is sim-
ply the epistemic condition of being suffi ciently reliably representable. 
Succinctly put, as long as the moral facts are suffi ciently epistemically 
accessible, the moral realist can make good on the idea that evolution 
indirectly cares for the truth of moral attitudes.33
In order to make this second answer plausible, let us run through a 
number of candidate conditions that might easily come to mind. Let us 
begin with full objectivity, i.e., total mind-independence. This is not a 
requirement for the story to work since if the moral facts are like some 
consequentialist think they are—i.e., an action’s maximizing pleasure 
or maximizing desire satisfaction, which is belief-independent but not 
entirely mind-independent—the story is in no way excluded. But fully 
objective, entirely mind-independent moral facts could fi t the same bill. 
If the moral facts ultimately consisted in some primitive moral reasons 
relations, holding between some descriptive facts and certain respons-
es (actions and/or attitudes), they could play the very same role—as 
long as the moral reasons facts are suffi ciently epistemically acces-
sible. Next, the moral facts could even be subjective in the sense of be-
ing relative to persons. Suppose that what is morally good or what one 
morally ought to do varies from person to person. Even this would not 
undermine the story. As long as the moral facts are suffi ciently epis-
temically accessible (and practicable …) acting in accordance with the 
moral facts would be likely to contribute to fi tness. Finally, it does also 
not matter whether the moral facts are reducible to descriptive facts 
or causally effi cacious. Perhaps, some condition like supervenience is 
32 Cf. Street (2006: 125).
33 It seems appropriate to call this condition ‘epistemic’ since reliable 
representation is suffi ciently similar to knowledge, and knowability would of course 
be fi ne, too.
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necessary for suffi ciently reliable representation. But causal effi cacy 
does not seem to be required (as the case of knowledge of mathematics 
shows).34 And supervenience of the moral on the non-moral facts is a 
thesis that is widely accepted among moral realists, both naturalistic 
and non-naturalistic ones. To be sure, reliable representation (or even 
knowledge) is not for free. Arguably, it requires some mechanism which 
supports the reliable tokening of representations. But the important 
point is that it is not as though the social role of moral facts described in 
the story required some robust anchoring of moral facts in non-moral, 
descriptive facts. It is only the epistemic accessibility that might re-
quire this. And supervenience might be all that is needed for that.
The conclusion of these considerations is thus easily stated. The one 
and only constraint that the role (R) puts on the moral facts is their 
epistemic accessibility. As long as the moral facts are suffi ciently reli-
ably representable the social story of reactive attitudes can work and 
thus ‘implement’ a way of truth being highly signifi cant to fi tness—
truth about the moral facts. Therefore, the moral realist has a plausible 
story about how to explain why premise (2b) in the argument above 
fails. And the story is fully in line with, and spells out, the idea of evo-
lution caring indirectly for the reliability of our MAs. The evolutionary 
infl uence on our cognitive process C is fully compatible with its favor-
ing the reliability of C. The MA’s raison d’être is tied to the reliability 
of their generating process C. Whether the moral facts have to be objec-
tive in any interesting sense can be left open—unless it is entailed by 
the epistemic accessibility of the moral facts.
If this conclusion is correct, it follows that the evolutionary debunk-
ing argument does not pose any new problem for moral realism, since 
the epistemic accessibility of moral facts is an old problem that has 
long been recognized and discussed. So interestingly, we have been 
lead back to the old epistemic problem, and no new problem arising 
from evolution has been discovered.
In sum, the evolutionary debunking argument that has been ex-
tracted from the Streetian considerations does not yield a sound argu-
ment against moral realism—not even if some objectivity requirement 
on moral realism is imposed. Once a proper statement of the argument 
34 Here is the right place to critically comment on Mogensen’s distinction 
between proximate and ultimate causes of MAs and corresponding kinds of biological 
explanation (cf. Mogensen 2015). The application of this distinction matches the 
distinction between the evolutionary process E and the cognitive process C insofar 
as the former concerns phylogeny and the latter concerns the individual. But there is 
no causal implication: the cognitive process need not have moral facts as proximate 
causes. So Mogensen’s focus is too much on causation, whereas the appropriate focus 
should be on reliable representation. In addition, the explanatory story on offer here 
gives moral facts a role in the phylogenetic, evolutionary genesis of our MAs—so an 
‘ultimate’ role, if you like—and not (only) in the individual’s MAs—the ‘proximate’ 
role –, as Mogensen wants to have it (cf. Mogensen 2015: 197). Therefore, Severini’s 
criticism of Mogensen’s use of the proximate/ultimate distinction does not apply to 
the story on offer here (cf. Severini 2016).
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has been formulated—argument A3—the crucial weakness becomes ap-
parent: evolution’s pressure towards fi tness does by no means exclude 
that reliable cognitive processes will be favored. Quite the contrary, it 
seems that evolution indirectly cares for truth, or at least can indirectly 
care for truth. The moral realist can tell a plausible explanatory story 
about how this infl uence could have developed, the story of reactive 
attitudes. Thus, the response to the debunking argument is no longer 
just an in-principle possibility of ‘indirect truth caring’ but a concrete, 
though sketchy, explanatory account of how this in-principle possibil-
ity can be realized. In addition, we can see what the moral facts have 
to be like in order to play their role in this story. They simply have to 
be suffi ciently epistemically accessible, and no more. The evolutionary 
considerations, therefore, bring out the importance of the epistemology 
of moral facts. Some solution to this epistemological challenge has to be 
found. But this is not a new problem, and so the evolutionary argument 
does not yield any new constraint on moral realism.35
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